“Stuxnet is definitely not a military code, at least not a Western one” said Shai Blitzblau, Head of Maglan-Computer Warfare and Network Intelligence Labs, interviewed by Defense Update. “Stuxnet is a sophisticated and highly advanced code, but it lacks certain elements commonly associated with military operations” Blitzblau explains that the broad, indiscriminate attack on industrial computers launched by Stuxnet is not characteristic to a military operation, where the nation launching the attack tries to minimize collateral damage and focus on a specific target.

“Every student can write a module discriminating the target computer and localizing the attack to a specific target” Blitzblau added, “The fact that this sophisticated code does not have such elements, and certain aspects of the functionality of the malicious code, allege to the creators’ aiming Stuxnet to target Siemens industrial systems on a broad base, rather than a specific application as reported by the media.” In addition, a high level code aimed at Network Intelligence Operations would have an anti-anti debug mechanism to avoid forensic analysis.

Who could be the perpetrators behind this attack and what were their goals?

Blitzblau describes an act of ‘Advanced Industrial Espionage’ a deliberate cyber sabotage launched by someone against Siemens – this could be a competitor or service-provider, seeking to exploit the situation for business opportunities – first create the problem and then – help fixing it. But there are also other aspects to the attack that could tell a different story. “This could also be a ‘general test’, prior to a planned attack, or a proof of concept, initiated by an academic group – in the past we witnessed such attacks, for example, one attack was launched from Japan, on video drivers.” According to Blitzblau a military test going out of control is not an option here. “Military offensive cyber ops are not conducted this way and even when an intelligence agency conducts such tests they will go a long way to ensure that the test is limited to a specific volume and not spread it worldwide.” He said. Blitzblau attributes the widespread infection of industrial networks in Iran to low level of security and, apparently the high popularity of Siemens systems in the country. In fact, Stuxnet could have propagated from Belarus, and Russia unintentionally by Russian system engineers, using USB devices to update and program Siemens systems in Iran, Indonesia and India. The intensity of attack in Iran could illuminate the intensity of their activities associated with the nuclear projects in Natanz and Bushehr.

While the media attributed Stuxnet as a cyber weapon launched by Israel or the USA against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the possibility of it being a cyber weapon developed and launched by international terrorists’ organization has not been tackled seriously by the media. Yet, Blitzblau has a grim outlook as to the potential value of such cyber weapon in the hands of terrorist organizations. “International terrorist organizations certainly have the will, and means to launch such an attack, and they could gain the most from it – creating mega events like bringing airports, disrupting train traffic, cutting power supplies and utilities. “Even if they did not create it, they now have access to such a weapon, as Stuxnet is now in their reach, like a loaded gun. Despite the countermeasures developed by Microsoft and Siemens, there are many networks that have not been patched yet – some will never be protected. Blitzblau warns that the current attack will probably set the route for new vectors for cyber terror, as the malicious code is modified and manipulated into a range of new forms and variants. The vulnerabilities highlighted by the current attack will undoubtedly set the course for more attacks aimed at industrial controllers and embedded systems. With that, the risk of compromising military systems will grow dramatically; as such elements are widely used in military weapon systems.

Stuxnet uncovers the vulnerability of our infrastructure system – exposing the vulnerable interfaces between the logical and physical world, these elements are totally unprotected and open disastrous vulnerabilities to attack by cyber terrorism and cyber criminals.

“We have analyzed the code, and compared it to other, similar known malware, this new code has definitely the parameters of a ‘military code’, but it lacks some aspects one would expect to find in military cyber warfare application” Shai Blitzblau, Head of Maglan-Computer Warfare and Network Intelligence Labs, interviewed by Defense Update. Among these parameters are communications, encryption, internal self-protection (anti-anti debug) and certain methodologies that are followed by western cyber warfare specialists.

While Iran was marked as Stuxnet’s most popular target, other countries falling prey to the new malware were many third world nations where Siemens equipment is widely used and security and legal discipline in licensing and security methods are not strictly enforced. Stuxnet also attacked Indonesia, India, Russia, Belarus, and in Kirgizstan. What’s more important is where the Stuxnet didn’t attack – China and – most surprisingly – Germany, where only few systems were compromised yet none of the reports was confirmed!

“Siemens is reporting that industrial plants in Germany have also been hit by the Stuxnet worm. According to Wieland Simon, press spokesman at Siemens, approximately one third of the 15 infections discovered at industrial plants worldwide have been found at sites in German process industry sector. Siemens’ own plants are said not to be affected” simon added.

Although it was ‘discovered’ by the media in late September, Stuxnet is definitely not a new threat and, in fact, most of the vulnerabilities it exploited have already been ‘patched’. It was created sometime in January-February according to the ‘time stamps’ embedded into the compiled code. Initial anomalies related to the new threat were reported about two months later. Maglan received the new threat as part of our technical support services to some of our customers, who were hit by the malware. After thorough analysis we have uncovered several interesting aspects of the code that were not familiar before, and lead us to assume that Stuxnet was not created by a western cyber warfare organization. However, the great effort and resources invested in this code testify to its value to its creators, who spent great investments – financial, technical and in – most importantly, in assets considered scarce commodities among the hackers community.

Targeting Industrial and Infrastructure Systems

First, and most important, the code was not written by “home based” hackers – unlike most other malware codes, it is not directed against conventional windows systems, but specifically at industrial systems, by exploiting four different vulnerabilities (security ‘holes’ detected by hackers but not yet patched, three months ago, by the targeted software provider – also called ‘Zero Day’ exploits). Such Zero-Day Exploits are not spent easily by hackers, and would rarely be used in tandem, let alone in a ‘quad’ formation, testifying to the fact that the developer team had no limits on the use of resources.

Multiplicity and redundancy were also employed addressing the targeted operating systems. The creators of Stuxnet also went into great effort to ensure the malware covers all potential avenues of approach – including systems that rarely interest hackers – like WindowsCC, a Microsoft operating system designed for embedded systems. The code also targets all Windows platforms from Windows ME, XP, NT, Vista, 2000, 2003 and 2008 to the latest Windows 7 – again not a simple task for regular hackers. Other aspects of the code target specific vulnerabilities attributed to Siemens PSC7 systems, designed to control Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) widely used in utility and industrial SCADA systems.

While each of these penetration axes operates independently, these parallel lines are coordinated and supporting each others to achieve the goal – ‘hijack’ as many PLCs as possible and burry embedding itself into the command and control hubs. The malicious code does not carry the type of spyware commonly found in other bots, but is rather ‘attack oriented’ – carrying a ‘payload’ in form of a set of commands designed to bypass those controlling the PLC, and carry out a set of actions as instructed by the hijacker.

Self Contained Weapon’s Payload

The carry out and control such attack the creators of Stuxnet embedded three separate means of communications in the code – two are considered ‘advanced’ and one ‘low level’. However, the code lacks communications elements that would enable a ‘nation state’ operation much more flexibility and control, having the capability and means to conduct operations in the proximity of the targeted site. One of the unique features of Stuxnet is the way its payload is ‘packed’ into the code.

Previous malware attacks employed a communications mechanism that could download the payload – the intelligence collecting ‘spyware’ or ‘attack’ from the command and control center – this enables the use of more compact code, better precision and more flexibility as the attack unfolds. Stuxnet has the payload built-in to the code, alluding to the fact that it was targeted against known targets and its creators had little consideration as to the collateral damage they create. Again, this methodology is rarely used among Western cyber warfare operatives.

Although the code was designed with remotely controlled ‘uninstall’ and termination function, these do not work properly in most cases, as the level of sophistication invested in this segment fall behind the general high standard of Stuxnet.

Countermeasures and Concealment

Nevertheless, the creators took great effort to conceal the malicious code from detection, in an effort to mask its existence, activity and objectives. For example, the malicious code was written as a ‘dynamic link library’ (.dll) commonly associated with hardware device drivers – software elements rarely considered a risk, since these they are written, signed off and distributed by hardware providers to support specific functions of such hardware. Users commonly download these devices as part of hardware installations and support and trust their own anti-virus scanners and the companies that provided the drivers for their security. Alas, Stuxnet exploited this vulnerability – it uses highly sophisticated anti-anti-virus countermeasures, addressing 38 (!) known anti-virus programs, not only few of the most common ones, as most hackers will do.

In addition, the code is digitally signed by VeriSign as genuine Siemens software. Later, Siemens reported that these signatures were stolen but did not explain how such sensitive material was compromised and reached hostile elements. Technically, ‘extracting’ such signature from existing products is possible, but this capability is beyond the reach of hackers and could be done only with massive computing power not available in non governmental levels. In this area, Stuxnet creators have again demonstrated they can be generous – to ensure their code is accepted, they used two different signatures – by chip Taiwanese makers JMicron and Realtek. The fact that these signatures are time-stamped in within more than a week of each other could testify as to the lengthy process of the preparation, testing and operation planning.

Iran is preparing a massive force of small but highly capable combat elements capable of disrupting oil transportation through the Persian Gulf and the Straight of Hurmoz choke point. The Iranians have developed unique operational concepts employing coordinated swarm attacks that could effectively defeat large, well protected surface combatants such as those operated by the allied naval forces present at the Gulf. Many of these Swarm elements are currently stationed at the naval base at Bandar Abbas, acting as the Swarm’s ‘Hornets Nest’ at the southern end of the Hurmoz Straits in the Persian Gulf. In recent, highly publicized naval exercises held by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’, swarm attacks were demonstrated by engaging targets from extended range by anti-ship missiles, while smaller fast boats were closing in at high speed, firing rockets and Rocket propelled Grenades (RPG) from very short range.

In recent years Iran is escalating its swarm capabilities to higher levels, with the development of indigenous weapons and platforms tailored for the Persian Gulf Theater of operation. Among these elements are mini submarines, amphibian seaplanes, high speed missile boats and medium range anti-ship missiles. All are designed as compact, cost efficient element that together, creating a force multiplier that cannot be ignored even by the world’s largest, most capable navies.

A key element in this ‘hornets nest’ is the Ghadir mini-submarine. The first two locally built subs were delivered in 2008 and this year during a visit at the base four subs were visible. These submarines built for short missions operating at shallow water, carrying out coastal reconnaissance, mine laying and engagement of surface targets, including moving vessels and oil rigs. Mining by submarines could become one of Iran’s modus operandi as detection or attribution of such action to the actual perpetrator is almost impossible.

Another element of the hornets nest was unveiled this week, as Iran’s Revolutionary Guards naval units displayed over a dozen planes during an official visit of the Guards’ commander, brig. General Ahmad vahidi at Bandar Abbas. Unveiled as a prototype in 2006, Bavar-2 is designed to operate as a rapid reaction force, equipped with aerial cameras and communications links transmitting images in real-time to command centers at sea or on land. The seaplane is also equipped with a machine gun. It is flown by a single pilot and is fitted to operate in day or night, using night vision devices.

In August 2010 the Iranians unveiled the ‘sting’ of the hornets – the new Zulfikar fast patrol boats (shown in the video below), an all-aluminum built fast boat armed with Iranian-made Nasr-1 medium range anti-ship missiles. (actually, an Iranian version of the Chinese C-704 missile). The Iranians plan to deploy large numbers of these boats, armed with the locally produced missiles, being able to saturate the defenses of highly protected surface vessels.

The new Bavar-2 Wind in Ground Effect (WIG) amphibian seaplane, designed to perform short range maritime surveillance, coastal patrol and provide target acquisition for the Zulfiqar fast boats, enabling them to launch their missiles at maximum range, thus avoiding counter attack from the surface. As a WIG amphibian, Bavar-2 has unique capabilities to ‘sea skim’ just above wave-top level, or perch at sea level, thus evading detection by hostile radars. Typically, such planes cruise at a speed of 130 km/h and perform optimally at an altitude of few meters above the sea although, technically some WIG designs can reach a maximum altitude of 300 meters.

In times of crisis it is assumed that the fast boats, submarines and seaplanes will disperse to many coastal locations, from where they will be able to launch surprise attacks against merchant ships, tankers or military targets. The submarines and amphibians will provide the eyes and ears for the missile carrying fast fast boats, which could group into attack swarms to strike and disperse immediately after it, thus making it difficult for the enemy to launch an effective counter strike.

Related posts:

• Iran Displays New Missiles on Army Day parade (2010)
• Iranian Great Prophet V Wargames at the Straits of Hurmoz (April 2010)
• Serious implications of the Hurmoz naval Incident (2008)
• Hurmoze Straits Come Into Focus as Gulf Tension Rises (Analysis, 2007)

• Erkanoplan Amphibious Airboat (ESKA) – an early Russian WIG flying boat concept – 1973.

Over the past few weeks, the omens of a brewing international onslaught on Israel’s presumed nuclear weapons’ capability have been steadily mounting. But more than the Arab anti-nuclear machinations, which have become standard for several decades, Israeli officials are perturbed over an apparent shift in Washington’s recent policy.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave some insinuation on this trend, at the NPT Review Conference, last May. In the hall, she repeated President Obama’s support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. However in a follow-up media conference, she attempted to take on board Israel’s central argument that it needs to have peaceful relations with all its Middle Eastern neighbors before it can be expected to disarm. “Now, given the lack of a comprehensive regional peace and concerns about some countries’ compliance with NPT safeguards, the conditions for such a zone do not yet exist,” she declared. In Jerusalem, though, officials are still very much concerned and skeptical over Washington’s attitude.

Egypt went as far as to call Israel’s position on nuclear weapons a “chutzpah” (insolence – in Hebrew) at the Vienna International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) general conference on Wednesday, Sept 22. But persistent calls of Arab countries to the international community to verify the alleged Israeli nuclear potential will not force Israel to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, the group of 51 mostly Western countries, backed by Washington, still rejected the text, proposed by the Arab IAEA member states, but including UN Security Council members Russia and China.

Possible existence of Israel’s alleged 200 warheads and the lack of the IAEA’s control on nuclear reactor in the Israeli town of Dimona are the main concern of Arab countries. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak indicated last April that the international community should not expect his nation to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty anytime soon. “Israel has never threatened to destroy other countries or nations, whereas Iran today, and in the past also Syria, Libya and Iraq that have signed the treaty, have broken it systematically with explicit threats on Israel’s existence,” he added.

But on the other hand, U.S. President Barack Obama recently called for universal membership in the treaty, which currently acknowledges only five nuclear powers — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States- while India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty and so has North Korea. “As far as Israel goes, I’m not going to comment on their program,” Obama said. “What I’m going to point to is the fact that consistently we have urged all countries to become members of the NPT”.

Based on Obama’s new Middle East strategy, his stance should not be surprising, but the fact is, that U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and all his successors have “silently” supported Israeli’s possession of nuclear weapons and its unflinching position outside the nuclear treaty. However, be that as it may, Obama’s nuclear philosophy and his coordination with the Egyptians on a nuclear-free Middle East do certainly raise profound questions. If and when it comes to a distinctive crisis situation, how much pressure is he likely to exert on Israel to help create a nuclear-free Middle East or even to sign the NPT?

Israeli Former Deputy National Security Advisor Charles Freilich believes that the position of Egypt is aimed to remove its concern in relation to alleged Israeli nuclear potential. “I think that Israel’s position is reasonable. Israel also endeavors to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone, once there is reasonable peace with all its neighbors, and if all countries of the region refuse all weapons of mass destruction.

From an Israeli point of view, its leaders insist on keeping their nuclear capability in complete ambiguity because they never officially admitted having such a capability. But under the shadow of so-called opacity, the Jewish State has already received the reputation in being a nuclear power- presenting a strong and viable deterrent, which has kept it safe, for decades, from overwhelming destructive power of its Arab neighbors.

When Japan’s Yukiya Amano, the new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), visited Israel, last August, he did not leave the country wiser, since Israel, under the wing of Washington, is still allowed to maintain its so-called “nuclear ambiguity”. No wonder that the IAEA is traditionally far from pro-Israel.

But there seems to be a new wave in the public debate of Israel’s long nuclear ambiguity strategy. Although the issue is still under strict national security limitations, there have been persistent calls for a more inhibited and candid public discussion on this, for Israel, existential issue. In fact, when considering the dangers of Iranian’s nuclear weapons program, those in Israel, who widely differ on political ideology, are finding rare common ground to agree.

But there are now new/old voices emerging calling for a public debate on the sensitive issue of Israel’s nuclear ambiguity stance.

Israel should abandon its policy of “nuclear opacity,” neither confirming nor denying possessing of nuclear weapons, urges Dr Avner Cohen, a leading non-proliferation expert, and Marvin Miller, a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in an article in the September-October issue of the prestigious Foreign Affairs. According to the team Israel’s nuclear served the Jewish nation’s strategic deterrence well in its time, but is now becoming increasingly anachronistic.

Dr Avner Cohen, author of the 1998 published controversial book “Israel and the Bomb,” has maintained a rare outspoken view on this sensitive subject, which frequently placed him into friction with the authorities. Cohen claims that the ambiguous attitude is not only anachronistic, but actually anti-democratic. In his words: “Nuclear ambiguity is a cornerstone of Israeli strategic thinking. It was born many years ago, and sealed as part of a comprehensive deal with the United States in 1969. It was appropriate at the time, but today, in my opinion, it is not just anachronistic, but foolish and anti-democratic”.

Called “The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with Bomb,” a new book, published this year, Dr Cohen argues further that the opacity policy leads inevitably to an undemocratic lack of accountability to Israel’s citizens. “Israel is today the least transparent nuclear state. It never took moral and national responsibility for what it did. And I think that’s wrong,” he charges.

Countering warnings, that by abandoning ambiguity, Israel would encourage dangerous demands calling it to disarm, while its Arab neighbors would continue to develop weapons of mass destruction under cover, Cohen dismisses this by stressing that Israel is strong enough to defend its own strategic interests and will not easily be coerced to do things which may hurt her survival.

Dr Avner fears Israel’s insistence on ambiguity will leave Israel increasingly vulnerable to the charge that it is a nuclear-armed pariah state. He believes world powers have come to see the status quo as dangerous: “Israeli deterrence can no longer be seen as a guarantee against a nuclear attack – either from a terrorist group like al-Qaida or an enemy nation, such as Iran.” He warns that Israel’s stance is also increasingly coming at odds with the new policies of President Barack Obama’s U.S. administration, which is pushing for more global transparency on atomic weapons. “While I think that America is still genuinely committed to allowing Israel to maintain its nuclear arsenal, I think the U.S. no longer sees ambiguity as something sacred.” Cohen adds.

Former MK Professor Uzi Even, a nuclear expert, has been arguing that Israel should join the NPT for years, claiming that this would have avoided the ongoing disagreement with Obama’s administration on the issue. Moreover, according to Even, the policy of ambiguity has turned the Dimona reactor into a dangerous plant, as without the constant flow of necessary materials for updating; it has long ago passed the age in which it should have been shut down.

Professor Eyal Zisser, head of the Middle East studies department at Tel Aviv University, also argues that Israel should prepare to lift the decades of ambiguity. . “The perception of ambiguity was good when no one in this region came close to nuclear capabilities. But now the situation is changing rapidly, with Iran already racing towards nuclear weapons, Israel may find itself facing a nuclear Iran within years. It must therefore consider lifting the ambiguity in the face of an Iranian threat, thus creating a clear and convincing balance of terror, Prof Zisser warns.

On the other hand, Dr. Efraim Escolai, of the Institute for National Security Studies, insists that the ambiguity is here to stay. “Calls for all countries to join the NPT are nothing new, this has been going on for decades and occasionally surfaces, but this is not what will change stability in the region and Israel’s nuclear policy.” Escolai, who has a rich history in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, argues it would be unwise to change a policy that has served Israel well throughout the years. Professor Yair Evron, an expert on the distribution of nuclear arms, also objects to lifting Israel’s policy of ambiguity, saying that actually the desire to nullify Israel’s nuclear capabilities hides behind the international calls for Israel to join the NPT. However, Evron admits that with the changing realities, Israel should adapt a new, more open discussion on nuclear issues, encouraging public debate on the pros and cons of this vital issue of Israel’s security.

According to Leslie Susser, diplomatic correspondent of the Jerusalem Report, at the height of the consternation in Jerusalem over America’s public backing for the nuclear-free Middle East idea, some soothing messages are still arriving from Washington reiterating staunchly that the US would never do anything to harm Israel’s security.

But over the coming months, in the heady mix of potentially acrimonious talks with the Palestinians and the Arab linkage over the call towards denuclearization of Iran, conjoining with nuclear disarmament of Israel, that fundamental commitment will be have to be thoroughly tested.

African defense companies are challenging the dominant Western suppliers of mine protected armored vehicles, competing for MRAP type vehicle contracts. According to Ivor Ichikowitz, Executive Chairman of the South African Paramount Group, South Africa’s largest independent defense and aerospace contractor, African companies have emerged as technological equals to some of the world’s top manufacturers of Mine and IED Protected armored Vehicles (MPVs).

Ichikowitz referred to the recent growth in the domestic and continental demand for armored vehicles in Africa, “With African defense spending up nearly a third since the end of the Cold War, Africa is purchasing more defense and security systems. This has stimulated manufacturers, engineers and scientists to produce world-class products.”  African companies such as the Paramount Group are not only competing on an international level, with interest from governments in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, but also offering better in-country benefits for purchasers. Whereas the Western majors manufacture their equipment far from the destination market, Paramount Group takes an ‘in-country’ approach, where it establishes production facilities in regional markets. This ensures that the economic and development benefits associated with production, training and marketing help the local population, not just the shareholders in New York or London.”

“The world has finally discovered that Africa has some of the best technologies at affordable prices” said Ichikowitz.

The Paramount Group has unveiled today a new armored infantry fighting vehicle called Mbombe. According to the company, the vehicle has not yet been ordered but several potential customers are already interested, including Gabon.

The expected arrival of the P800 Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missile in Syria is considered the first serious attempt by Syria to directly challenge the Israel Navy since the 1973 war, when the Israeli Navy sunk five Syrian vessels in the first missile-boat engagement known as the ‘Battle of Latakia’. Four decades later, the P800 Yakhont is far superior than the Styx missiles that failed to protect the Syrian Navy in 1973.  Much like the Russian-Indian Brahmos, the earlier Moskit and Supersonic Alpha, Yakhont has the capability to strike its target at supersonic speed, flying at very low level, leaving the defender much shorter time to react. Yet, ship defenses have come a long way since the Electronic Warfare (EW) systems that saved the day and won the battle for the Israelis.

AEGIS systems, used on U.S. Navy and many NATO vessels, the European PAAMS, used by the Royal Navy, French and Italian navies and Israel’s new Barak 8 ship air defense system are designed to match such treats. So does Israel’s ‘Magic Wand’ system, employing the Stunner missile interceptor, capable to counter these potent missiles effectively if employed in surface/surface or ship/surface role. However, the majority of smaller naval vessels, still equipped with ‘point defense’ anti-missile systems were not designed to counter such high speed attacks, particularly when it comes in salvos of two or four missile.

Such elements are at risk within ranges of 300 km, by missiles fired from the Mediterranean Syrian naval bases at Tartus and Latakia. Yakhont typically cruises to the target area at high altitude, and then descends for a sea skimming attack from under the horizon. The distance at which it begins its descent can be programmed before launch, by determining the achievable range, which is between 120 (low level flight) – 300 km (high mid-course, low-level beyond the horizon to the target.

While some navies could avoid this area, for Israel, the long range of the P800 means its naval vessels could be at risk, even at their main base in Haifa, a site already compromised by rockets fired from Lebanon during the 2006 war. Israel’s second naval base in Ashdod could be targeted from land-based sites in Southern Syria. Furthermore, when targeting Israeli naval patrols in international waters off the Lebanese coast, P800 can be vertically launched from inland sites in Syria or Lebanon, fired behind the Lebanon mountain ridge, avoiding detection from the sea, thus minimizing the early warning for the targeted vessels. Therefore, accelerated fielding of Barak-8 and Magic Wand systems should be a top priority for Israel. Another risk for Navies operating in the Persian Gulf presents a technology leak – by such a missile falling into Iranian hands, which could accelerate the introduction of such potent weapons in Tehran’s growing anti-shipping arsenal.

The current contract, estimated to be worth $300 million includes the delivery of two Bastion coastal defense systems, each includes 36 missiles. It is yet unclear if the Syrian navy will also opt to equip its naval platforms will with these new weapons. The Yakhont can be fitted with relatively small vessels, from corvette size and larger. The Bastion system is operated from mobile launchers on land, each launcher carries two ready to launch missiles. Another configuration is designed for airborne platforms. But even with these potent weapons in hand, the Syrians may not yet be ready to employ them effectively. Syria currently does not have the means to effectively target the missile beyond the horizon, lacking maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles or attack aircraft capable of carrying such missiles. Even their largest Petya class Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) frigates do not have a flight deck for the Ka-28 (Helix) helicopters, operated by the Syrian Navy. The Syrians do not have the capability to detect, track and designate targets at those ranges since, being a small, defensive force, they did not have any weapon reaching out to these ranges. This is particularly true when the target is ‘silent’ and cannot be targeted by surface-based Electronic Support Measures (ESM).

If the Syrians are seriously planning to extend their operational reach with the missile, one has to watch out for Syria to reach for UAVs, naval patrol aircraft (Be-200 or Il-38 from any CIS nation or other countries (decommissioning such aircraft could be an option). Such transfer of equipment could be unnoticed as it does not involves weapons transfer. They could also opt for upgrading the Su-24MK ‘Fencer D’ to take on maritime recce role. Even more serious is a combination of Su-27/Su-30 and P800s, which could provides the P800 with the stand-off targeting and attack capability against surface targets. The Russians are using their Onyx version of the weapon with their Su-33 carrier-based naval fighters. By knowing the P800 is within range, the Israeli Navy will definitely lose its dominant and unchallenged position in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly along the Lebanese coast, and therefore should take defensive measures – certainly be on guard, which it failed, during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when ISN Hanit was hit unexpectedly by a Hizbollan C-802 missile – having turned off its on-board defensive systems.

Of course, for deliberate ‘ambush’ attacks Syria could try deploying forward targeting using merchant or fishery vessels sailing in the Eastern Mediterranean  or submarines, provided by allies such as Iran (since Syria do not have any submarines now, after decommissioning their 3 Romeo subs about six years ago). But this is really a long, long shot that would cost Syria dearly.

Altogether, for the short term, the arrival of the P800 in the Mediterranean is a serious threat. Over time, as the Israel Navy gets its Barak-8 missiles and ‘Magic Wand’ deployed, the threat could be contained, given the Syrians will not deploy large numbers of these missiles on platforms and constellations that would maximize its capability to launch saturation attack against the IN leading vessels. Whatever the case may be, both sides, the Syrians and the Israelis need time to deploy and defend so the threat may be serious, at first sight, but viable solutions are already in sight.

With the fueling of the Bushehr nuclear reactor initiated this weekend, the Shi’ite Mullahs mark the culmination of their nation’s long ambition to acquire access to atomic energy. Whether this should remain a peaceful overture to similar reactors to follow suit, or the mark the omen for a more sinister nuclear weapons construction effort- will remain to be seen. This article is an abstract, continue to Defense Update News Analysis.

Although the 1,000 Mw plant will be the first operational nuclear power station in the Middle East, its very composition does not pose serious proliferation risks. Being constructed from a light water reactor, fueled with low enriched uranium, at first sight it seems, that it should not fit into the known weapons grade plutonium production process.

What concerns America and the Israelis, more than fueling Bushehr, is Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment, a process that can be used to make fuel for nuclear arms. Tehran already has one potential weapons stream through its enrichment program and another pending, being the heavy water Arak reactor that is ideal for weapons-grade plutonium production.

President Barack Obama’s top adviser on nuclear issues, Gary Samore, told The New York Times that he thinks it would take Iran “roughly a year” to turn low-enriched uranium into weapons-grade material. “We think that they have roughly a year “dash time,” Gary Samore was quoted as saying. By “dash time,” the official referred to the shortest time Iran would take to build a nuclear weapon, judging from its existing facilities and capacity to convert stocks of low-enriched uranium into weapons-grade material, a process known as “breakout”.

Read the full version in today’s Defense Update News Analysis

With the fueling of the Bushehr nuclear reactor initiated this weekend, the Shi’ite Mullahs mark the culmination of their nation’s long ambition to acquire access to atomic energy. Whether this should remain a peaceful overture to similar reactors to follow suit, or the mark the omen for a more sinister nuclear weapons construction effort- will remain to be seen. This article is an abstract, continue to Defense Update News Analysis.

Although the 1,000 Mw plant will be the first operational nuclear power station in the Middle East, its very composition does not pose serious proliferation risks. Being constructed from a light water reactor, fueled with low enriched uranium, at first sight it seems, that it should not fit into the known weapons grade plutonium production process.

What concerns America and the Israelis, more than fueling Bushehr, is Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment, a process that can be used to make fuel for nuclear arms. Tehran already has one potential weapons stream through its enrichment program and another pending, being the heavy water Arak reactor that is ideal for weapons-grade plutonium production.

President Barack Obama’s top adviser on nuclear issues, Gary Samore, told The New York Times that he thinks it would take Iran “roughly a year” to turn low-enriched uranium into weapons-grade material. “We think that they have roughly a year “dash time,” Gary Samore was quoted as saying. By “dash time,” the official referred to the shortest time Iran would take to build a nuclear weapon, judging from its existing facilities and capacity to convert stocks of low-enriched uranium into weapons-grade material, a process known as “breakout”.

Read the full version in today’s Defense Update News Analysis

Seven years and five months after the U.S.-led invasion, the last American combat brigade was crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border on before dawn today. (check AP report by Rebecca Santana).

It was the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 2nd Infantry Division that pulled back from Iraq, two weeks ahead of President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31, 2010 deadline for ending U.S. combat operations there. Yet, the U.S. presence in the country is far from over as some 56,000 U.S. troops are staying for at least another year, in what is designated as a ‘advise and assist‘ non-combat role. Special Forces will continue to help Iraqis hunt for terrorists while other troops will be training and assisting Iraqi troops on their security missions. In fact, as the 4th Stryker BCT left Iraq, soldiers of the 2nd Stryker BCT of the 25th Infantry Division are deployed in Iraq as members of an ‘Advise and Assist Brigade’, the Army’s designation for brigades selected to conduct security force assistance. The 2nd Stryker BCT is one of seven ‘Advice and Assist Brigades’ currently positioned in the country, along with National Guard brigades.

The military was preparing for the withdrawal for several months, restricting media reports on the brigade’s movements until they were almost to the border. The brigade decided to fly half of the troops by air and send 4,000 soldiers overland, maintaining the 360 Strykers vehicles force in combat ready posture for an extra three weeks. The Strykers left the Baghdad area in separate convoys over a four-day period, traveling through potentially hostile territory over the 500 km road to Kuwait at night, minimizing U.S. military movements by day. Highway overpasses and other sensitive points were covered by U.S. military overwatches and attack helicopters, with the banks of the highway constantly swept for suspected IEDs. The biggest threat was roadside bombs planted by Shiite extremist groups who have a strong foothold in the south.

The AP story, which was followed by other reports in the U.S. media, seems aimed at looking for a ‘happy end’ for the U.S. role in the Iraqi conflict. However, the international press is not impressed. Here are few the skeptical commentators:

No security and stability in Iraq

U.S. withdrawal from Iraq: Ending or outsourcing the war?

Pentagon denies pullout of combat troops out of Iraq accomplished

Deadly bombing comes hours after talks break down

Bloodbath in Iraq amid political impasse

Will Obama keep US troops in Iraq beyond 2011?

Defense Update News Analysis: The Beginning Or the End of The Iraq War?

Defense Update News Analysis: Are Iraqi Security Forces Up to the Challenge?

Seven years and five months after the U.S.-led invasion, the last American combat brigade was crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border on before dawn today. (check AP report by Rebecca Santana).

It was the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 2nd Infantry Division that pulled back from Iraq, two weeks ahead of President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31, 2010 deadline for ending U.S. combat operations there. Yet, the U.S. presence in the country is far from over as some 56,000 U.S. troops are staying for at least another year, in what is designated as a ‘advise and assist‘ non-combat role. Special Forces will continue to help Iraqis hunt for terrorists while other troops will be training and assisting Iraqi troops on their security missions. In fact, as the 4th Stryker BCT left Iraq, soldiers of the 2nd Stryker BCT of the 25th Infantry Division are deployed in Iraq as members of an ‘Advise and Assist Brigade’, the Army’s designation for brigades selected to conduct security force assistance. The 2nd Stryker BCT is one of seven ‘Advice and Assist Brigades’ currently positioned in the country, along with National Guard brigades.

The military was preparing for the withdrawal for several months, restricting media reports on the brigade’s movements until they were almost to the border. The brigade decided to fly half of the troops by air and send 4,000 soldiers overland, maintaining the 360 Strykers vehicles force in combat ready posture for an extra three weeks. The Strykers left the Baghdad area in separate convoys over a four-day period, traveling through potentially hostile territory over the 500 km road to Kuwait at night, minimizing U.S. military movements by day. Highway overpasses and other sensitive points were covered by U.S. military overwatches and attack helicopters, with the banks of the highway constantly swept for suspected IEDs. The biggest threat was roadside bombs planted by Shiite extremist groups who have a strong foothold in the south.

The AP story, which was followed by other reports in the U.S. media, seems aimed at looking for a ‘happy end’ for the U.S. role in the Iraqi conflict. However, the international press is not impressed. Here are few the skeptical commentators:

No security and stability in Iraq

U.S. withdrawal from Iraq: Ending or outsourcing the war?

Pentagon denies pullout of combat troops out of Iraq accomplished

Deadly bombing comes hours after talks break down

Bloodbath in Iraq amid political impasse

Will Obama keep US troops in Iraq beyond 2011?

Defense Update News Analysis: The Beginning Or the End of The Iraq War?

Defense Update News Analysis: Are Iraqi Security Forces Up to the Challenge?